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Executive Summary 
This thesis is presented in order to obtain the Bachelor’s degree HES. 
 
The aim of this current thesis is to answer the following question: What are the 
consequences of the short selling ban enacted from the 12th of August 2011 until the 
12th of February 2012 on the CAC40? 
 
In the first part, we define in what consists short selling and describe when it is used. 
We learn that it is used as a speculative tool when a company is overpriced, it is also 
used as a hedging technique and it is especially a useful tool to reduce the volatility in 
a portfolio. 
 
Later we learn about the political context as well as the stock market situation that led 
the French regulator AMF to the introduction of the short selling ban. The three key 
moments that triggered the introduction of the short selling ban are the downgrade of 
America’s AAA credit rating to an AA, the doubt about France’s AAA credit rating and 
mainly the risk of contagion of the European debt crisis to the countries Spain and Italy. 
 
In the second part we make a quantitative analysis with the use of multiple regression 
analysis to determine the impact on the short selling ban on the stock returns, the 
volatility, the skewness and the kurtosis. 
 
First we learn that the ban failed to support prices and increased volatility on the 
restricted stocks. Finally, it deteriorated the price discovery, as the skewness was less 
negative during the short selling ban. No conclusion can be drawn from our results 
concerning the occurrence of extreme outcomes because the analysis on the kurtosis 
were not significant. 
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Introduction  
Short selling has always been portrayed in bad light by the press and has always been 
criticized when stock prices fall. During the recent crisis we’ve seen a lot of regulatory 
authorities introducing short selling bans when the prices decrease dramatically. 
 
Yet, there is a lack of theoretical foundation to support this view. On the contrary many 
research papers tend to confirm that short selling has many benefits. Short selling 
improves the price discovery, in other words it helps prices reflect more accurately the 
fundamentals of the company1. Ernan Haruvy and Charles Noussair went even further and 
explained in their research2 that “a sufficiently large short selling capacity results in a 
substantial reduction in the magnitude and duration of bubbles”. 
 
However, the French regulatory body (AMF) decided to introduce a short selling ban in 
August 2011 as the European crisis became more intense. Unfortunately, regulatory 
authorities made no comments regarding the expected goal of their action. They have 
always been vague about the reasons why they put the ban in place. But it seems logical 
that what the regulatory authorities wished to achieve was primarily an increase of the 
return of the stock with a decrease of volatility. The previous crisis in 2008 has been 
analysed and the effectiveness of the ban has already received criticism. 
 
The new short selling ban period offers a new opportunity to analyse the effect of these 
measures on the stock markets and especially on the restricted stocks. Therefore, the aim 
of this research paper is to evaluate if this ban has improved or deteriorated the stock 
market conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 Short Sale Constraints And Stock Returns: Charles M. Jones and Owen A. Lamont (August 2011) 
2 The Effect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Spot Asset Markets (June 2006) 
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First Part 
1. Definition 
1.1 What is short selling? 
 
There is no precise and legal definition of short selling, however, the FSA said that “there 
is a general understanding in the marketplace that a short sale is a sale of a security that 
the seller does not own” (FSA, 2002, p.9)3 
To further define short selling, there is the first classification made of “explicit” and “implicit” 
short selling. The implicit short selling is made of the possibility to speculate on the 
downturn of a stock by the mean of futures, forwards, CDS, options and other derivatives.4 
The explicit short selling is the process of selling short the stock directly. We can further 
classify the explicit short selling into “cover short-selling” and “naked short-selling” 5. 
1. Covered short selling is when the seller has borrowed the securities, or made 
arrangements to ensure they can be borrowed, before the short sale. 
2. Naked or uncovered short selling is when the seller has not borrowed the securities at 
the time of the short sale, or ensured they can be borrowed. 
The problem is that often it is unclear whether the short-selling operation is covered or 
naked. 
According to the press release of the 29 June 2012 of the European Commission, the 
definition of naked short selling and covered short selling is now more precise. Regulation 
(EU) No 236/2012 states that short selling of shares can only happen if sellers have either 
borrowed the shares, have a binding agreement to borrow the shares, or have an 
arrangement with a third party meaning they can reasonably expect to deliver the shares 
they are selling.6 
                                            
3 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp17.pdf 
4 http://www.professionsfinancieres.com/docs/2012102306_174_vn_m_short-selling.-need-or-fear.pdf (page3) 
5 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-508_en.htm 
6 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:086:0001:0024:en:PDF 
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In the context of my paper, only the covered explicit short selling is considered. All other 
types of classifications have only been mentioned as to contextualize and define the scope 
of the subject of enquiry. 
Cover short selling: 
The process of cover short selling means that a broker company will lend a stock to us that 
we will have to give back in the future. Meanwhile, the borrowed stock is sold and bought 
back at a certain time later. The investor hopes that the price goes down during the time of 
the holding. Finally, the stock has to be given back to the brokerage firm. Figure 1 shows 
the process in detail. 
Because the short seller borrows the stock, he has to pay back all dividends or rights 
declared during the time of the holding.  The short-seller borrows the stock; therefore a 
short interest has to be paid.  
 
Figure 1: Process of Short selling
7 
1.2 What is short selling used for? 
 
Because using short-selling means speculating on the fall of the underlying stock price, it 
might seem counterintuitive to use it. However the use of short selling in a portfolio has 
many advantages. The mere fact that many governments banned its use during the crises 
is a proof that it is a common tool used by investors. Below are the three main advantages 
of short selling and the answer to the question “what is short selling used for?” 
Use of short selling:  
• As a speculative tool when a company is overpriced 
                                            
7 Handbook of short selling : Greg N. Gregoriou (2012) 
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• For hedging techniques 
• To lower the volatility of a portfolio 
 
1.  Speculative tool when a company is overpriced 
If you identify that a company is overpriced, you can use the short-selling technique by 
being short instead of being long. That way, you will profit if the market value of the 
underlying stock converges to its intrinsic value. During the financial turmoil, all the traders 
who shorted UBS stocks were expecting to buy it back at a lower price in the future. And 
so short selling offers opportunity for generating returns even if the market is bearish. 
2.  Hedging techniques 
Short selling allows to hedge against the market risk (beta risk). Considering a portfolio 
with a massive exposure on the CAC40 market through long positions in the underlying 
stocks, the portfolio can be hedged in many ways. It can be simply hedged by shorting all 
the stocks that are contained in the portfolio (partially or totally depending on our view in 
the evolution of the stocks). Or it can be shorted differently, for instance the investor can 
short the benchmark index (CAC40 in our example) using exchange traded funds (ETF) or 
futures. This is an example of how hedge funds managers use a long/short strategy in 
order to reduce the portfolio’s net market exposure.8 
3.  To lower the volatility of a portfolio: 
But the most advantageous element of short selling in the management of a portfolio is the 
risk reduction for each unit of return. Or inversely, short selling allows for a better return for 
each unit of risk. In other words, short selling allows an optimization of the Sharpe ratio. 
Short selling is one of the hypotheses of the CAPM theory that draws the efficient frontier 
line on which lies the portfolio with the highest level of return for its level of risk. In his 
study “Portfolio Optimization with Many Assets: The Importance of Short-Selling”, Levy 
and Moshe found out that the proportion of assets held short in mean-variance efficient 
portfolios converges to 50% as the number of assets increases. So the short selling is a 
very important part of the portfolio optimization process. In addition, Levy and Moshe 
                                            
8	  http://aima-­‐canada.org/strategy_paper_series.html 
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found out that with the constraint of short selling, the cost in terms of risk reduction would 
be extremely high. For large portfolios, relaxing the constraint can more than double the 
Sharpe ratio.9 The comparative chart below which contrasts the Sharpe ratio with and 
without the short-selling constraint illustrates this.  
Figure 2: Sharpe Ratio with and without short selling
 
 
                                            
9 Title:	  Portfolio	  Optimization	  with	  Many	  Assets:	  The	  Importance	  of	  Short-­‐Selling.	  Levy	  and	  Mosche	  (2001)	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2. Context of August 2011 
2.1 Stock market situation 
The following table shows the annualized return the month before the ban, the annualized 
daily volatility of the month before the ban and the increase in the average monthly volume 
compared to the average volume six months before. 
Table 1: Snapshot of the market situations the month before the ban 
 
In August 2011 the 11th, the CAC40 closed at 3149.38 euros. This is more than a 20% 
decrease in less than a month. The French index had not seen that level since 2009 
during the financial turmoil. The daily annualized volatility of the last month approaches 
34.10%.  
Axa drops 26.74% in less than a month with an annualized daily volatility of 36.51% of the 
last month. Crédit Agricole drops 26.97% with an annualized daily volatility of 72.63% over 
the last month. Société Générale drops 36.69% with an annualized daily volatility over 
82.15% of the last month. 
 
Annualized Yield Annualized 
Volatility 
Volume 
APRIL -22.66% 36.51% 22.21% 
AXA -26.74% 60.29% 51.95% 
BNP -23.09% 52.90% 74.86% 
CIC -15.88% 31.98% -11.44% 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
-5.20% 41.38% 15.55% 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
-26.97% 72.63% 71.22% 
HEULER HERMES -10.48% 36.15% 31.97% 
NATIXIS -12.33% 74.05% 41.45% 
SCOR -19.37% 44.69% 9.92% 
SOCIETE 
GENERALE 
-36.69% 82.15% 64.31% 
CAC40 -18.85% 34.10% 46.00% 
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In terms of volume the situation increased by more than 46% of trading volume on the 
CAC40 in comparison to the 6 months before. 
2.2 Reasons for the turmoil of 2011 
 
Here are some reasons for the turmoil of 2011: 
 
• Standard & Poor's downgraded America's credit rating from AAA to AA+ on 6th of 
August 2011 for the first time10. The US had an AAA rating since 194111.  
• Concerns over France's current AAA rating12. 
• Fears of contagion of the European sovereign debt crisis to Spain and Italy.  
1. S&P announced on August 5th that it would strip the country of its AAA for the first time 
since 1941. Even though rating agencies have lost credibility due to the overstating of the 
mortgage-backed bonds, the announcement had a huge effect. Indeed, on August 8th, the 
first trading day following the announcement, the Dow Jones dropped by 5.5%.  
In terms of the timing, the removal of the AAA was odd because in the meantime the 
Obama administration had to negotiate the increase in the debt ceiling. The explanation of 
S&P was that in comparison with other AAA countries like Germany or Great Britain, 
American’s debt, as percentage of annual GDP, was rising unsustainably. As we can see 
from the picture below, USA’s debt/GDP ratio is much higher and will still be much higher 
in the future in comparison with the two others countries. 
Figure 3: Gross Government Debt 
13 
                                            
10	  http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/06/business/la-­‐fi-­‐us-­‐debt-­‐downgrade-­‐20110806 
11	   http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-­‐08-­‐02/u-­‐s-­‐aaa-­‐rating-­‐faces-­‐moody-­‐s-­‐downgrade-­‐on-­‐debt-­‐economic-­‐
slowdown-­‐concern.html 
12	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/08/us-­‐crisis-­‐ratings-­‐idUSTRE7773KG20110808 
13	  The	  Economist	  :	  August	  13th-­‐19th	  2011 
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2. France’s debt stood at 82% of GDP at that time. This is one of the highest of any AAA-
rated country. The market participants were afraid that after the downgrade of the USA by 
the S&P rating agency on August 5th, it was now France’s turn to suffer a downgrade.  
Therefore on August 10th rumours and panic invaded the market places. French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy rushed back from his holiday to defend the country from financial attack. 
On the same day Société Générale fell by almost a fifth before recovering some ground to 
close down 15%. BNP Paribas fell by 9.5% whereas Crédit Agricole fell by 12%. The 
reasons why French banks reacted so intensely are that they had exposure to Greece, 
Italy and of course France. So it became very dangerous to hold French financial stocks in 
a portfolio. 
3. According to the Maastricht criteria, the ratio of the annual government deficit to GDP 
must not exceed 3% at the end of any given year. And the debt to GDP ratio must not 
exceed 60% at the end of the preceding fiscal year. But as we can see in the following 
graphic, none of the major European countries respected it.  
Figure 4: Gross Government Debt 
 
The 17 Euro-zone countries have in common the use of the Euro currency, however they 
do not share any fiscal policy integration. This is the major difference between the USA 
and the Euro-zone. This is problematic when the countries inside the same currency areas 
grow at different levels, as it was the case in Europe.  
Greece and Ireland that are much smaller countries already had difficulties and needed 
the help of the European Union. The problem worsened when the financial difficulties 
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impacted Spain and Italy which are much bigger countries. As a consequence those 
governments bonds yields near 6% to 7% which is simply unsustainable. The ECB didn’t 
want to intervene, as it is not coherent with inflation stability which is the first priority of the 
ECB. Meanwhile the politicians couldn’t come up with a solution. 
Finally, politicians put enough pressure on the ECB to make them intervene.  For the first 
time in the history of the ECB, the Central Bank began buying Italian and Spanish bonds in 
an effort to stop the sovereign-debt crisis on the August 8th.  
The initial reaction was positive and the CAC40 rose 1.1% on August 8th (previous trading 
day on August 5th: -8%). That reaction of the European Central Bank brought each 
country’s ten-year yields down by around a percentage point on August 8th over Germany. 
But this was only temporary; indeed the stock market dropped again the following day by 
almost 4%. 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the European Yields on the main countries in Europe. 
Since the introduction of the Euro as a currency, the interest rates converged to reach a 
common line between 2001 and 2009. After the Lehman Bankruptcy, the rate of Germany 
and France decreased whereas the rate of all the other countries increased. This graph 
also shows the reaction of the interest rate as of August 2011 when the ECB intervened. 
All the interest rates dropped.  
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Figure 5: European Yields go Vertical in 2011 
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Table 2 provides a reconstitution of the main events that took place the week before the 
short selling ban. 
 
Table 2: Retrospective of events before the ban 
Date Events Stocks Movements 
August 5th  USA Triple A downgrade 
by S&P 
-8% 
August 6th Market closed - 
August 7th Market closed - 
August 8th ECB intervention to buy 
Italian and Spanish bonds 
+1.1% 
August 9th Bearish trend still strong -4% 
August 10th  Rumour about the 
downgrade of France’s 
Triple A 
+3.3% 
August 11th Belgium, Italy, France and 
Spain announce short-
selling ban 
-4.1% 
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3. Decision of the short selling ban 
 
This is in the context where four European countries announced a short-selling ban on 
August 11th. Belgium, France, Italy and Spain announced a short-selling ban on a total of 
59 stocks14. Ireland still had a short-selling ban on the financial stocks since September 
200815. Turkey and Greece16 imposed a short-selling ban on August 8th. These measures 
were lifted first by the French government on the 11th of February 2012 (six month later) 
and last by the Italian government on the 24th February 2012. 
In this paper we study the case of France and the 10 stocks that were concerned by the 
short-selling ban. Initially, the AMF (Autorité Française des Marchés) imposed a ban only 
during 2 weeks that lasted until the 25th of August, it was then prolonged until the 29th of 
September, and again until the 11th of November and was finally lifted on the 11th of 
February 2012. The short-selling ban in France concerns the following ten stocks: 
• April Group 
• AXA 
• BNP Paribas 
• CIC 
• CNP Assurances 
• Crédit Agricole 
• Euler Hermès 
• Natixis 
• Scor 
• Société Générale 
Those four countries have put this measure in place after a very turbulent week on the 
market place. However not all the European countries saw the benefit in the introduction of 
a short-selling ban. Britain, the Netherlands and Austria said they saw no need for action, 
                                            
14 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/business/global/europe-considers-ban-on-short-selling.html?_r=1& 
15 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-03/irish-lifting-of-short-selling-ban-only-affects-bank-of-
ireland.html 
16 http://www.financialdetectives.org/uncategorized/belgium-france-italy-and-spain-impose-short-selling-bans-
august-12/ 
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while Germany said it would instead\rather push for a Europe-wide ban on a so-called 
naked short selling17. 
 
Such measures were already taken in 2008 during the Lehman Brother collapse. 799 
American institutions were banned from short selling and most of the countries with a solid 
financial system followed the move by instating a short-selling ban. During that time lots of 
researches have been written about the effect of short selling on the stocks markets. Now 
we will review the literature that has been written and what we have learned from the 2008 
short-selling ban.  
                                            
17 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/12/us-europe-banks-idUSTRE77A3QJ20110812 
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4. Literature Review 
 
The crisis of 2008 has been the foundation for a lot of research related to the short selling 
ban. The kind of research that have been performed are diverse. Most research seeks to 
analyse the impact of short selling ban on the return, the price discovery (or the process 
used in determining spot prices through supply and demand), the volatility or the 
distribution characteristics of the stocks. There are also many studies which focused on 
the market liquidity but this is not the object of our studies.  
LISA A. SCHWARTZ and KATI D. NORRIS made a comparison between the restricted 
financial stocks and the non-restricted financial stocks during the short selling ban period 
of 2008. In addition it divided into small, medium and large market capitalization firms to 
analyse the effects of size. Restricted and non-restricted firms suffer declines in returns 
during the ban and an increase in their volatility level. The restricted firms saw their 
skewness increase in positive territory. In terms of the volatility, ABRAHAM LIOUI (2009) 
shows that the short-selling ban was followed by a rise in the volatility of the markets and 
that the risk/reward had worsened18.  
The work of PEDRO A. C. SAFFI AND KARI SIGURDSSON is very interesting because 
they reached the same conclusion, but starting from another perspective. They used the 
annual average lending supply and loan fees to measure the degree of short-sale 
constraint. They found that firms with higher lending supply and lower short-selling 
constraints have a higher degree of negative skewness and lower levels of volatility.19 
They also found that the price efficiency is affected by a high short-sale constraint, since 
limited lending supply are associated with lower efficiency. One of the major studies that 
has been made is the one from BEBER AND PAGANO (2010). They also analysed the 
data of 16491 stocks in 30 countries from January 2008 to June 2009 and found that the 
bans were detrimental for liquidity, (ii) slowed down price discovery, especially in bear 
market phases, and especially (iii) failed to support stock prices, except possibly for 
U.S. financial stocks.20 
                                            18	  http://msc-­‐financial-­‐markets.edhec.com/servlet/com.univ.collaboratif.utils.LectureFichiergw?ID_FICHIER=1328885973188 19	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=949027 
20 Beber,	  A.,	  &	  Pagano,	  M.	  (2010).	  Short-­‐selling	  bans	  around	  the	  world:	  Evidence	  from	  the	  2007-­‐09	  crisis.	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BAI, CHANG AND WANG (2006) show that constraining short sales reduces markets 
allocation and informational efficiency by limiting trades for risk-sharing and private 
information. These two effects drive market prices in opposite directions but if the 
information effect is significant, short-sale constraints can actually cause prices to 
decrease and to be more volatile.21 COPELAND explains that a short-selling ban worsens 
the price discovery by hindering the negative opinion to be reflected in the price. In 
others words, the « no voters » are not in the currently quoted price.  ARTURO BRIS, 
WILLIAM N. GOETZMANN, AND NING ZHU found some evidence that prices incorporate 
negative information faster in countries where short sales are allowed and practiced, so 
that the price efficiency is better without short-selling ban. They found strong evidence 
that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, market returns 
display significantly less negative skewness.22 
BOEHMER, JONES AND ZHANG (2009) made a research on the September 2008 short-
selling ban on the US market and concluded that the shorting activity drops by 77% in 
large-cap stocks, stocks prices appear unaffected by the ban and that most of the firms 
suffer a severe degradation in market quality, as measured by quoted spreads, effective 
spreads and volatility.23 ARTURO BRIS (2008) found that the market quality, measured 
through the quoted spread, relative spread and the price range is significantly worse for 
the stocks that were affected by the short-selling ban compared to other comparable 
stocks.24 
 
  
                                                                                                                                     
 
 Working	  Paper,	  University	  of	  Naples,	  Italy.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://ideas.repec.org/p/sef/	  csefwp/241.html. 
21 http://web.mit.edu/wangj/www/pap/BCW_061112.pdf 
22 http://www.arturobris.com/index_files/bear.pdf 
23 Boehmer,	  E.,	  Jones,	  C.,	  &	  Zhang,	  X.	  (2009).	  Shackling	  short	  sellers:	  The	  2008	  shorting	  ban.	  Working	  Paper,	  Cornell	  University,	  Ithaca,	  NY.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers	  .cfm?abstract_id=1412844. 24	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Second Part  
 
5. Methodology 
In this section, I will explain the model I used to measure the impact of short-selling ban on 
the stocks markets. My model is inspired by the model of Abraham Lioui in his research 
paper called « The Undesirable Effects of Banning Short Sales » of April 2009. It shows 
how the markets responded negatively to the short-selling ban on the restricted stocks in 
France in the period of the short-selling ban in 2008.  
5.1 Description of the time frame 
The data has been downloaded from Yahoo Finance. Yahoo Finance is considered one of 
the best free data supplier on the market. All the collected data are adjusted for dividends 
payment and any splits that could have happened. My research covers the time period 
between May 25th 2010 until February 12th 2012. The study has three distinct time 
frames. First there is the pre-crisis period that goes from May 25th 2010 until February 
18th 2011. Then the crisis period that goes from February 18th 2011 until September 22th 
2011. Finally, the short-selling ban goes from August 12th 2011 until February 2012. The 
sample size for each stock and index is 418 trading days. The number of observations is 
important to take into consideration because we used multiple regression analysis with 
three explanatory variables. It is commonly said that for each explanatory variable we 
should have twenty observations so in our case, it is respected. 
The short-selling ban period is simply the official period in which the ban was active under 
the governance of the AMF. To help define the better pre-crisis and crisis period, we first 
pre-define a time horizon identical with the short-selling ban period. We then tested, by 
iterative search some specific key points to find where we had the more consistent and 
clear results. 
5.2 Description of the data set 
The short-selling ban was effective for 10 stocks on the French indexes; we thus made the 
same calculations on all these stocks. All the stocks are traded on the CAC Family but not 
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all are traded in the CAC40. To make a comparison we use five indexes: CAC40, DAX, 
FTSE, NASDAQ and the S&P500. 
The CAC40 is the only index where some stocks were prohibited from short selling. We 
can thus make a comparison between the stocks that were prohibited from short selling 
and the benchmark CAC40. In addition we can also make a comparison with other indexes 
where no short selling ban had been active during this time. These comparisons help draw 
some conclusions concerning reasons for the changes.  
5.3 Description of the equipment 
Finally to help us make all the calculations we used the two programs Excel and SPSS. 
Excel is easy to use, customizable and especially, it is compatible with other financial and 
data manipulation and was thus used for many calculations. It has been used among 
others to transfer the raw data from Yahoo Finance to an Excel sheet. Excel was used to 
make all the basic calculations.  
SPSS on the other hand offers a more effective way to manage data, it offers a wider 
range of options and above all shows a better output organization. That is very 
advantageous in the context of our research paper because a massive amount of data is 
being used, transformed and analysed. So in this context, SPSS was of great utility and 
was used among others for the computation of the multiple regression analysis. SPSS 
offers to choose many optional statistics tests (for example the collinearity test) and offers 
more customizable features for our test such as the possibility of removing the constant. 
5.4 Multiple Regression Analysis 
The multiple regression analysis is a statistical measure that attempts to determine the 
strength of the relationship between one dependent variable (usually denoted by Y) and a 
series of other changing variables (known as independent variables). 
Figure 6: Multiple Regression Formula 
Multiple Regression: Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + B3X3 + ... + BtXt + u 
5.4.1 Dependant Variables 
We have run multiple regressions on the performance, the volatility, the skewness and the 
kurtosis.  
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5.4.1.1 Performance 
The performance is measured as the average return of the last sixty days.  
5.4.1.2 Volatility 
The volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the returns. Volatility is a measure 
of dispersion. In statistical terms, the standard deviation is the squared root of the average 
squared deviations from the random variable’s expected value.  
Figure 7: Standard Deviation 
 
Where σ is the standard deviation, xk represents each value in the data set, µ is the mean 
of all the observation and n is the number of observations. 
Volatility is the most common risk measure despite its imperfection. The two most 
important imperfection of the volatility as a measure of the risk are: 
• Upside price movement are considered as risky as the downside price movement 
• Volatility is estimated with past price movement 
For the multiple regression analysis, we computed the volatility as the average daily 
volatility of the last sixty days. 
5.4.1.3 Skewness  
In finance, skewness is the measure of the symmetry of the return distribution. Skewness 
can be “positive” or “negative”. A “positive” skewness is skewed to the right whereas a 
“negative” skewness is skewed to the left. Skewness is a measure of downside risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Positive and Negative Skewness 
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Statistically, skewness of a random variable X is the standardized third moment. If the 
result of the computation is greater than zero, the distribution is positively skewed. If it's 
less than zero, it's negatively skewed. A normal distribution has a skewness of zero. 
Figure 9: Formula of Skewness 
 
Where µ is the mean, σ is the standard deviation, X is a random variable and E is the 
expectation operator. 
Skewness informs us about the spreading out of the distributions. A negative skewness 
means that the spread between all the data in the negative territory is wider than in the 
positive. The same goes for the positive skewness but on the positive territory. 
For our multiple regression analysis, the skewness is computed as the average daily 
skewness of the last sixty days.  
5.4.1.4 Kurtosis 
The kurtosis analyses the occurrence of extreme movements. It is a measure of the 
“peakedness” of the probability distribution and helps describe the shape of a probability 
distribution. Statistically kurtosis is the standardized fourth moment. 
Figure 10: Formula of Kurtosis 
 
Where µ is the mean, σ is the standard deviation, X is a random variable and E is the 
expectation operator. As we could expect, the kurtosis rose during the crisis. 
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Figure 11: General Form of Kurtosis 
 
 
The mesokurtic distribution has a kurtosis of three (or an excess kurtosis of zero). The 
most common example of a mesokurtic distribution is the normal distribution. The 
leptokurtic distribution has a kurtosis more than 3 (or an excess kurtosis more than 0) a 
more acute peak around the mean and fatter tails; it has thus more probability of extreme 
movements. The platykurtic has a kurtosis smaller than three (or negative excess kurtosis) 
and has a lower, wider peak around the mean and thinner tails. 
For our multiple regression analysis, the kurtosis is computed as the average kurtosis of 
the last sixty days. 
5.4.2 Independant Variable 
5.4.2.1 Dummy variables 
The aim of our multiple regression analysis is to differentiate the effect of the short selling 
ban from those of the financial crisis. To capture the effect of the financial crisis and the 
short selling ban we use two dummy variables.  
5.4.2.2 Lag volatility 
In time series analysis, lag volatility is often used to avoid bias. This allows varying 
amounts of recent history to be brought into the forecast. We are aware that adding a 
lagged variable can damage the results of the multiple regression by dominating the others 
explanatory variables. However our independent variables do not exhibit a high serial 
correlation and a heavy trending in exogenous variables so our result should not suffer. 
The use of a lagged variable as an explanatory variable makes our results very persistent 
and lead to an R^2 close to 1. This is the reason why we do not show it.  
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5.4.2.3 Market Fluctuations 
To capture the market fluctuation, we added the benchmark return as an explanatory 
variable. For all the banned stocks, we added the CAC40 index return which can be 
considered as the benchmark, since every stock is part of the CAC Family. For each 
index, we add their own return as the benchmark. 
5.4.3 Multiple Regression features 
5.4.3.1 Intercept: 
Our model does not contain any intercept. The dummy variables are explicitly explained in 
the equation and therefore the risk of collinearity may appear. 
5.4.3.2 Robustness  
For each of our multiple regression analysis, we computed a robust model that we put at 
the end. The goal of the calculation of the robust model is to capture two additional 
economic environments.  
We added a TED Spread which is aimed to capture liquidity issues. The TED Spread is 
the spread between the LIBOR rate and the T-bill rate. The T-bill rates are considered risk-
free whereas the LIBOR is the interest rate paid on interbank deposits in the international 
money markets commonly used as a benchmark for short-term interest rates. The data 
was collected from the official Internet website of the FED. 
We added the CREDIT Spread that measures the default premium. The Credit Spread is 
defined as the difference in yield between an AAA-rated company and a BAA-rated 
company. As for the TED Spread, the Credit Spread data were collected on the Fed’s 
official website. 
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Abbreviations of variables: 
 
Coeff lag:  Coefficient of the lag variable. 
Coeff index:  Coefficient of the CAC40 for the restricted stock. 
Coeff Crisis:  Coefficient of the crisis (dummy variable). 
Coeff Short:  Coefficient of the short selling ban (dummy variable). 
T-stat lag:  T-statistic of the lag variable. 
T-stat index:  T-statistic of the CAC40 for the restricted stock. 
T-stat Crisis:  T-statistic of the crisis (dummy variable). 
T-stat Short:  T-statistic of the short selling ban (dummy variable). 
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6. Analysis 
 
6.1 The impact of the short selling ban on the performance of the 
banned stocks and of the market 
 
Table 3: Geometric Mean of the daily return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table is very clear as we notice that during the period of the pre-crisis, the indexes as 
well as the stocks all show positive results. This confirms that this period was an uptrend 
on the stock markets. During the crisis, we see again that the stocks and the indexes are 
negative, however it is interesting to point out that the stocks dropped a lot more than the 
indexes. What the indexes tell us is that the DAX and the CAC40 dropped two to three 
times as much as the American indexes, this is the result of the European crisis that made 
the stock indexes of Europe suffer more. Finally, during the short-selling ban, all indexes 
switched trends by increasing again even though we notice a weak trend for the CAC40 
with only 0.04% increase. Whereas all indexes switched sign during the period of the 
 Pre-crisis Crisis Short selling ban 
CAC 0.09% -0.26% 0.04% 
DAX 0.13% -0.24% 0.09% 
FTSE 0.08% -0.13% 0.08% 
NASDAQ 0.10% -0.08% 0.12% 
S&P500 0.09% -0.10% 0.10% 
    
    
APRIL 0.01% -0.39% 0.01% 
AXA 0.08% -0.38% 0.10% 
BNP 0.12% -0.58% -0.05% 
CIC 0.14% -0.24% -0.17% 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.05% -0.20% -0.23% 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.17% -0.67% -0.17% 
HEULER 
HERMES 
0.18% -0.28% -0.05% 
NATIXIS 0.08% -0.46% -0.25% 
SCOR 0.17% -0.17% 0.19% 
SOCIETE 
GENERALE 
0.21% -0.77% -0.04% 
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short-selling ban, suggesting that the introduction of the short selling ban has been 
effective, the situation is different with the stocks. Indeed, seven out of ten stocks further 
decreased during the period with sometimes even very large losses. Natixis, CNP 
Assurance and Credit Agricole dropped respectively -0.25%, -0.23% and -0.17% on a daily 
average during that period. It is an interesting picture because Europe was in crisis, the 
indexes increased after the introduction of the short selling ban but not the restricted 
stocks. The downtrend seemed however to have slowed down.  By mean of comparison, 
we computed the arithmetic mean of the daily return that we put in the appendix25. We 
cannot however draw a definitive conclusion out of this Table. 
Table 4: Multiple Regression on the return 
The Coefficient of the crisis and the short selling ban confirm the trend what we have on 
the last table. The stocks went down during the crisis and still went further down during the 
                                            
25 See annex Table 11 
 COEFF 
LAG 
COEFF 
INDEX 
COEFF 
CRISIS 
COEFF 
SHORT 
T-STAT 
LAG 
T-STAT 
INDEX 
T-STAT 
CRISIS 
T-STAT 
SHORT 
CAC 0.97 0.01 -0.00 0.00 89.07 16.44 -1.46 0.27 
DAX 0.97 0.01 -0.00 0.00 113.14 16.95 -1.41 0.53 
FTSE 0.97 0.02 -0.00 0.00 98.92 16.79 -1.12 0.51 
NASDAQ 0.97 0.02 0.00 0.00 105.79 18.30 -1.04 0.46 
S&P500 0.97 0.02 -0.00 0.00 107.02 18.06 -1.21 0.59 
         
APRIL 0.97 0.01 -0.01 0.00 91.29 7.02 -2.47 0.57 
AXA 0.97 0.02 -0.01 0.00 81.90 13.75 -0.88 0.12 
BNP 0.96 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 73.95 12.75 -1.11 -0.77 
CIC 0.98 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 99.69 5.29 -1.35 -0.42 
CREDIT AGRICOLE 0.98 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 92.74 12.37 -1.29 -0.42 
EULER HERMES 0.96 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 70.86 7.90 -1.50 -0.72 
NATIXIS 0.96 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 72.45 11.86 -0.98 -1.30 
SCOR 0.96 0.01 -0.01 0.01 81.19 9.88 -1.33 1.48 
SOCGENERALE 0.97 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 84.27 11.90 -1.55 -0.03 
CNPASSURANCES 0.97 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 77.97 10.42 -1.29 -0.79 
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short selling ban. As we can see, no result is significant during the short selling ban. Thus, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis that “the short selling ban has an impact” on the return 
of the restricted stocks. However, we observe that the trend is very clear on the last table 
and it is confirmed by the coefficient on the multiple regressions. All in all this is a strong 
indication of a relationship even though the results are not significant. 
6.2 The impact of the short selling ban on the volatility of the 
banned stocks and of the market 
 
 
Table 5: Annualized Volatility 
 
The five indexes that we measured increased their volatility during the crisis whereas eight 
out of ten stocks increased their volatility during that time. During the short-selling ban the 
volatility of all indexes still increased further but it is interesting to note how volatile the 
CAC40 and the DAX indexes were. The CAC40 has an annualized volatility of 28.07% and 
the DAX has a volatility of 28.97%. It is probably related to the European crisis which 
affected the EU more than the other countries. The volatility of the stocks increased for all 
of them without exception and it is important to emphasize that some stocks have known 
 Pre-crisis Crisis Short selling ban 
CAC 19.92% 28.075 35.42% 
DAX 15.61% 28.97% 36.04% 
FTSE 15.99% 21.64% 24.37% 
NASDAQ 18.68% 26.28% 27.25% 
S&P500 16.75% 23.91% 25.24% 
    
    
APRIL 32.20% 31.24% 36.99% 
AXA 35.04% 48.63% 71.49% 
BNP 35.67% 53.40% 58.29% 
CIC 19.21% 21.75% 29.31% 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
28.19% 34.27% 45.67% 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
42.35% 54.79% 80.26% 
HEULER HERMES 32.42% 27.25% 39.50% 
NATIXIS 37.24% 49.03% 74.42% 
SCOR 21.17% 34.35% 41.88% 
SOCIETE 
GENERALE 
44.52% 59.79% 93.81% 
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some period of great volatility. Five of them even had an annualized volatility above 45%. 
Even though every stock experienced a systematic increase in volatility, the increase was 
not the same for all. Some stocks increased dramatically, for example, BNP Paribas rose 
from 35.67% during the crisis to 53.40% during the short-selling ban, and Societe 
Generale rose from 44.52% during the crisis to 59.79% during the short selling ban. On 
the other hand April only rose from 32.20% to 31.24% whereas CIC only rose from 19.21% 
to 21.75%. 
We see that the volatility increased during the pre-crisis period, it increased even more 
during the short selling ban period. We also notice that the increase was more powerful for 
the restricted stocks than the indexes. Because the volatility of the indexes also rose, it 
shows that it is not only because of the short selling ban but also probably because of 
market wide factors. 
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Table 6: Multiple Regression on the volatility 
This multiple regression analysis is very interesting as it shows how important and linked 
the increase in volatility and the crisis were. During the crisis, all indexes and eight out of 
ten stocks have positive and significant results. Euler Hermès is not significant and this 
confirms the previous result because it is the only stock whose volatility decreased during 
the crisis time period. Very oddly we noticed that the effect of the crisis was stronger on 
the indexes than on the stocks. 
But what is very interesting to look at is the effect of the short-selling ban on the volatility. 
What this table shows is that for the indexes, the short selling ban is not significant. This 
means that the volatility didn’t decrease significantly in the markets with the introduction on 
the short-selling ban. To further analyse the case of the indexes, we see a large difference 
between the two American indexes NASDAQ and the S&P500 which illustrates a negative 
relationship with the volatility during the time of the short selling ban. It is consistent with 
the past result of the historical volatility where we can see that for these two indexes, there 
were almost no changes during the crisis and the short-selling period. This again 
demonstrates that the crisis was a European one and that the USA did not suffer too much 
collateral damage.  
 COEFF 
LAG 
COEFF 
INDEX 
COEFF 
CRISIS 
COEFF 
SHORT 
T-STAT 
LAG 
T-STAT 
INDEX 
T-STAT 
CRISIS 
T-STAT 
SHORT 
CAC40 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.00 625.03 -0.55 4.82 1.32 
DAX 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.00 597.04 -0.63 6.71 1.19 
FTSE 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 697.04 -0.53 5.36 0.26 
NASDAQ 0.99 0.00 0.02 -0.01 598.66 -2.00 4.83 -1.59 
S&P 0.99 0.00 0.01 -0.01 566.17 -2.47 4.92 -1.62 
         
         
APRIL 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 647.42 -0.35 2.14 0.54 
AXA 0.99 0.00 0.03 0.02 585.47 0.58 4.26 1.79 
BNP 0.99 0.00 0.03 0.03 505.71 0.84 4.38 2.34 
CIC 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 491.34 -0.12 2.04 1.34 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.99 0.00 0.02 0.01 515.56 1.44 3.39 0.91 
EULER HERMES 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 690.32 0.04 0.89 2.15 
NATIXIS 0.99 0.00 0.03 0.02 502.00 0.07 3.92 1.83 
SCOR 0.99 0.00 0.03 0.02 489.57 -0.02 3.59 1.29 
SOCGENERALE 0.99 0.00 0.03 0.04 114.55 -0.04 3.15 1.93 
CNPASSURANCE 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 602.08 1.43 0.95 1.50 
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Concerning the stocks, the situation is even worse as the results of four stocks out of ten 
are still significant during the short selling ban. As a result, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that “the short selling ban had no impact on the volatility”. This signifies that the 
introduction of the short-selling ban increased with great significance the volatility on the 
restricted stocks. The results are consistent with the past results. We see that the stocks 
whose results are significant for the short selling ban period, are those who see their 
annualized volatility increase the most in the past results.  
In order to capture two additional economic environments, we computed a robust multiple 
regression analysis26. We found similar results with the robust form. We notice that the 
results of the restricted are even more significant when we consider other variables. It is 
also interesting to notice that the CREDIT Spread is significant five times out of ten. The 
CREDIT Spread measures the probability of default and thus it is consistent with our result 
because there was a high probability of default on some financial institutions. 
The above results are very interesting because they show how the regulatory authorities 
failed to reduce the volatility on the markets. The volatility increased significantly during the 
crisis and the short selling ban for almost all the stocks. Fear could be an explanation for 
the market behaviour, but I think that above all this shows that the markets participants did 
not trust the regulatory authorities’ interventions. 
We also made the same calculation with an added explanatory variable in the form of 
exponential variability27. The results are completely different and not very consistent with 
the past results. One reason for that might be the fact that the lagged variable and the 
exponential variable are too dominant in comparison with all the others variables. These 
results might be biased and this is the reason we don’t analyse further here. 
The t-stat result of the lagged volatility is highly significant as it is often the case with 
lagged variables. 
                                            
26 See Figure 13 in the annex 
27 See Figure 14 in the annex 
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6.3 The impact of the short selling ban on the skewness of the 
banned stocks and of the market 
 
 
Table 7: Skewness 
 
The previous results informed us of the increase in volatility of the indexes and the stocks 
during the financial crisis and the short selling ban. Now the study of the skewness aims to 
inform us on the direction of this movement. 
Skewness informs us about the spreading out of the distributions. As such, the skewness 
is a measure of the downside risk. These results will inform us if the skewness is positive 
or negative and thus, on what side our distribution of returns “leans”. 
Table 7 shows very clear and distinct results. During the crisis the skewness dropped for 
the indexes and the stocks. Indeed the only exception to this decrease is Natixis. It rose 
from -0.68 to 0.18. During the short selling ban period, every index increased its skewness 
 Pre-crisis Crisis Short selling ban 
CAC -0.03 -0.63 -0.05 
DAX 0.04 -0.51 -0.05 
FTSE 0.03 -0.44 -0.13 
NASDAQ -0.22 -0.41 -0.07 
S&P500 -0.02 -0.63 -0.16 
    
    
APRIL 0.01 -0.30 -0.57 
AXA 0.26 -0.50 0.23 
BNP 0.14 0.07 0.37 
CIC 0.77 -0.78 0.53 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.37 -0.07 0.39 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.38 -0.74 0.53 
HEULER HERMES 0.35 -0.78 0.46 
NATIXIS -0.68 0.18 0.33 
SCOR 0.37 -0.35 -0.01 
SOCIETE 
GENERALE 
0.47 -0.87 0.32 
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whereas only one stock decreased. Indeed only April decreased from -0.30 to -0.57. This 
result confirms the research paper of Lisa A. Schwartz and Kati D. Norris28. They found out 
that during the short selling ban of 2008, “the restricted firms showed an increase of the 
skewness in the positive direction”. 
During the short- selling ban only April is negatively skewed and Scor is symmetrical with a 
value of zero. Every other stock is showing a positive skewness. All in all, when we 
consider the situation in the pre-crisis period and during the short selling ban period, the 
situation is more ambiguous. Indeed four indexes out of five have dropped but their value 
is very similar. Five stocks out of ten decreased whereas four stocks out of ten rose.  
From these results we see a very consistent trend with skewness leaning to the left (on the 
negative territory) during the financial crisis and then switching sign during the short selling 
ban to lean on the right. This has always been seen better in the view of the investor to 
have a skewness leaning to the right than to the left. To confirm this positive outcome we 
run a multiple regression on the skewness on the next table.
                                            
28 The Impact of Temporary Short Selling Restrictions on the 
Volatility of Financial Stock Prices: Does Firm Size Matter? 
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Table 8: Multiple Regression on the skewness 
 
 
This table confirms the trend from the last results. The coefficients of the financial crisis 
are almost all negative for the indexes and the restricted stocks with the exception of two 
stocks (Natixis shows a positive coefficient and confirms the last result with an increase of 
the skewness during the financial crisis). The coefficients of the short selling ban are all 
positive except for APRIL which also precedently exhibits a decrease of the skewness. 
We see that the effects of the short selling ban seemed to have been stronger on the 
restricted stocks. No index has significant results whereas AXA, CREDIT AGRICOLE and 
CNP ASSURANCES have significant results with respectively 2.29, 2.03 and 1.97. These 
three stocks also had the biggest swing in their skewness in the past results. Among the 
stocks that had bigger swings in their skewness there was also EULER HERMES and 
SOCIETE GENERALE and based on the multiple regressions, we see that their results are 
almost significant with 1.84 T-STAT each. This means that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that “the short selling ban had no impact on the skewness”. 
 COEFF 
LAG 
COEFF 
INDEX 
COEFF 
CRISIS 
COEFF 
SHORT 
T-STAT 
LAG 
T-STAT 
INDEX 
T-STAT 
CRISIS 
T-STAT 
SHORT 
CAC40 0.96 0.00 -0.01 0.01 94.01 1.06 -1.15 1.16 
DAX 0.95 0.01 -0.01 0.01 62.37 3.33 -1.22 1.62 
FTSE 0.95 0.00 -0.01 0.01 68.84 1.23 -1.44 0.83 
NASDAQ 0.97 0.01 -0.01 0.01 69.71 4.22 -0.85 0.87 
S&P 0.93 0.02 -0.04 0.00 44.60 5.03 -2.59 0.73 
         
         
APRIL 0.95 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 71.13 1.63 -0.98 -0.93 
AXA 0.97 0.01 -0.02 0.02 102.35 1.65 -1.73 2.29 
BNP 0.96 0.00 -0.00 0.02 91.19 2.50 -0.83 1.81 
CIC 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.00 112.23 3.49 0.96 -0.07 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.97 0.01 -0.01 0.02 95.33 2.42 -1.22 2.03 
EULER 
HERMES 
0.96 0.00 -0.04 0.03 73.30 -0.01 -2.28 1.84 
NATIXIS 0.97 0.01 0.00 0.01 95.23 1.31 0.02 0.66 
SCOR 0.98 0.00 -0.01 0.01 119.01 1.59 -0.63 1.17 
SOCGENERALE 0.97 0.01 -0.01 0.02 106.53 3.12 -1.35 1.84 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.97 0.00 -0.01 0.02 85.89 2.35 -0.89 1.97 
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We have also run a robust multiple regressions on the skewness with the two additional 
variables, the TED Spread and the CREDIT Spread. These variables did not seem to have 
influenced the swing because they are never significant. If the robust multiple regressions 
show consistency with the coefficient, very oddly, no restricted stock is significant when we 
add these two variables.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above results is that it seems clear that the 
skewness switched sign from the financial crisis to the short selling ban period. The impact 
of the short selling ban is stronger on some stocks than others. It is interesting to notice 
that the more volatile stocks tend to be the same that switched sign significantly during the 
short selling ban period. SOCIETE GENERALE, AXA and CREDIT AGRICOLE already 
were among the stocks with the highest volatility and here they seemed to have benefited 
from the short selling ban to switch their sign. 
A positive skewness or a less negative skewness often refers to a deterioration of the price 
discovery. It means that the negative information on a stock needs more time to be 
incorporated in its price, so it takes more time for prices to decrease when negative 
information affects it. As such we can consider that this short selling ban deteriorates the 
price discovery of the restricted stocks. 
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6.4 The impact of the short selling ban on the kurtosis of the 
banned stocks and of the market 
 
 
Table 9: Kurtosis 
 
Because the kurtosis measures the probability of occurrence of extreme movements, its 
change informs us if the decision of the regulatory authorities to introduce a short selling 
ban helped reduce this occurrence.  
Through the analysis of the kurtosis, we can observe that all indexes rose during the crisis 
and oddly the two American indexes NASDAQ and S&P500 were more affected than the 
other three. It is odd since it was primarily a European crisis. The same trend has been 
observed for the restricted stocks during the crisis with an increase in the kurtosis level. 
These results are very intuitive because during a financial crisis, the occurrences of 
extreme movements tend to increase.  
 Pre-crisis Crisis Short selling ban 
CAC 0.73 1.13 0.55 
DAX 1.05 1.15 0.29 
FTSE 0.77 1.00 0.74 
NASDAQ 1.57 3.11 0.44 
S&P500 1.86 3.78 0.28 
    
    
APRIL 1.35 1.60 1.79 
AXA 0.24 1.71 0.78 
BNP 0.42 7.01 1.02 
CIC 1.22 3.63 6.11 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
1.35 1.90 0.77 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.81 1.72 2.44 
HEULER HERMES 2.15 2.58 0.61 
NATIXIS 3.83 2.87 0.31 
SCOR 1.47 2.41 1.22 
SOCIETE 
GENERALE 
0.73 3.17 1.48 
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The results for the short selling ban period are very clear for the indexes. All dropped 
dramatically, this would signify that the probability of occurrence of extreme movements 
has almost disappeared. In addition seven stocks out of ten dropped, leading to the same 
conclusion as for the indexes. Only CIC, CREDIT AGRICOLE and APRIL still saw their 
kurtosis increase during the short selling ban period. From this basic research we see that 
the kurtosis tends to decrease during the short selling ban even though it is not the case 
for all the stocks. 
 
Table 10: Multiple Regression on the Kurtosis 
 
 
 
 COEFF 
LAG 
COEFF 
INDEX 
COEFF 
CRISIS 
COEFF 
SHORT 
T-STAT 
LAG 
T-STAT 
INDEX 
T-STAT 
CRISIS 
T-STAT 
SHORT 
CAC40 0.97 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 139.76 -1.56 -0.46 0.44 
DAX 0.96 -0.01 0.00 0.00 88.67 -1.99 0.46 0.08 
FTSE 0.97 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 129.40 -3.22 -0.97 0.79 
NASDAQ 0.98 -0.03 0.00 0.00 94.30 -4.09 0.18 0.09 
S&P 0.97 -0.05 0.01 0.01 81.49 -4.88 0.31 0.41 
         
         
APRIL 0.96 0.01 0.00 0.04 94.00 1.61 0.32 1.77 
AXA 0.97 -0.02 0.00 0.02 137.05 -2.10 0.02 0.79 
BNP 0.96 -0.02 0.02 0.02 141.44 -2.21 0.72 0.60 
CIC 0.97 0.00 0.05 0.12 87.59 0.12 1.46 1.96 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.96 0.00 -0.01 0.05 71.98 0.43 -0.40 1.42 
EULER 
HERMES 
0.98 0.01 0.07 -0.02 114.06 0.55 1.12 -0.40 
NATIXIS 0.97 -0.02 0.00 0.00 120.55 -0.92 0.03 -0.01 
SCOR 0.99 -0.01 0.00 0.02 167.95 -0.99 0.10 0.76 
SOCGENERALE 0.96 -0.01 0.01 0.03 97.54 -0.80 0.18 0.94 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.97 0.00 0.01 0.02 89.46 0.57 0.51 1.01 
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The results of the multiple regression however are very ambiguous. First the coefficients 
do not confirm the trend that has been seen in the past results. Indeed only EULER 
HERMES has a negative coefficient for the short selling ban whereas almost all the stocks 
decrease their kurtosis in the last results. In addition, no result is significant.  
We ran a robust multiple regression on the kurtosis where we added the two additional 
variables, the TED Spread and the CREDIT Spread29. The results are even less 
conclusive. The sign of the coefficient are consistent neither with our past results nor with 
the last multiple regression. And we don’t have significant results for our restricted stocks 
either (with the exception of two). The two additional variables aren’t significant either. 
With these results, we failed to reject the null hypothesis that “the short selling had no 
impact on the kurtosis”. 
Finally, concerning kurtosis we cannot draw a definitive conclusions because of the mixed 
signals. We do not have consistent results between the simple estimation of the kurtosis 
and the two multiple regressions. In addition we do not have significant results. So if the 
kurtosis seemed to decrease during the short selling ban, the introduction of the ban 
probably did not have a big impact. 
                                            
29 See Annex Table x 
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7. Summary of Results 
 
7.1 Performance 
Whereas all indexes switched sign during the short selling ban, most of the stocks still 
experienced some losses. But the results were not significant and thus, the impact of the 
short selling ban was probably not so important. On the contrary all the T-STAT from the 
index were highly significant leading to the conclusion that the downtrend was probably 
due to the market environment instead of the exclusivity of the short selling ban. 
 
7.2 Volatility 
The volatility and the skewness are the core of our results. We see that the restricted 
stocks experienced a first round of increase during the financial crisis and a second round 
of increase during the short selling ban. The coefficient confirms the trend of the simple 
estimate of the volatility and more importantly we see that the effect of the short selling 
ban were stronger on the restricted stocks than on the market. This leads to the conclusion 
that the short selling ban had an impact on the level of volatility and contributed to its 
increase. This supports the conclusion of the Research Paper from Abraham Lioui30. This 
is a sign of the failure of the regulatory authorities to reduce the fluctuation on the stocks 
markets by its intervention.  
 
7.3 Skewness  
The simple estimation of the skewness highlights the fact that the skewness was negative 
during the financial crisis and positive during the short selling ban. The coefficient of the 
multiple regression analysis confirmed the trends perfectly and more importantly we saw 
that the impact was stronger on the restricted stocks than on the stock markets. Very 
interestingly we saw that the impact was not similar for all stocks. The stocks which 
highlighted high volatility tended to have benefited more from the switch of sign of the 
                                            
30 « The Undesirable Effects of Banning Short Sales » , April 2009 
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skewness with significant results. The current results supports and confirm those found by 
Lisa A. Schwartz and Kati D. Norris31. This increase in the skewness during the short 
selling ban deteriorates the price discovery while not allowing negative information to 
impact the stock prices fast enough. 
7.4 Kurtosis 
The kurtosis increased during the crisis leading to an increase in the occurrence of 
extreme movements whereas it tended to be lower during the short selling ban without 
being a general move. Unfortunately our results from the multiple regressions did not help 
us draw any conclusion on the impact of the short selling ban in this decrease. The 
coefficient did not confirm the trend of the simple estimate of the kurtosis and the results 
were not significant, nor were those of the robust multiple regression. The conclusion to be 
drawn is that the impact of short selling on the level of kurtosis is probably not so 
important. The move of the kurtosis is probably drawn by other variable not present in our 
model.  
  
                                            
31 The Impact of Temporary Short Selling Restrictions on the 
Volatility of Financial Stock Prices: Does Firm Size Matter? 
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Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we analysed the ten restricted stocks on the CAC40 during the ban of 
August 11th 2011 to February 12th 2012 using a multiple regression analysis. The 
objective of this research paper was to inform us whether the decisions of the regulators to 
introduce a ban on the stocks markets of the CAC40 had more positive than negative 
effects.  
 
We found out that the banned failed to support stock returns and the analysis is consistent 
with previous studies (LISA A. SCHWARTZ and KATI D. NORRIS as well as the work of 
BEBER AND PAGANO (2010)) who found similar results. In addition, this research shows 
that the volatility increased during the ban and this confirms the work of ABRAHAM LIOUI 
(2009). Finally this research also found out that the introduction of the ban was followed by 
an increase of the skewness, suggesting that the imposition of constraints reduces the 
price efficiency and this supports the work of GOETZMANN, AND NING ZHU. 
 
These results do not support the view expressed by regulators that short-sale constraints 
can stabilize prices nor decrease the volatility. On the other hand, the reduction of the 
price efficiency tells us that the negative information needed more time to be included in 
the price of the stocks. This might be the only achievement of the regulators with their 
intervention. They only allowed to slow down the downside movements when there was a 
negative information on a company. 
Regarding the negative results on the price return and the volatility, the costs appear to 
outweigh the benefits. Finally, we can only hope that in the view of these results, the 
regulators will now consider them before intervening in the markets. 
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Annexes 
Table 11: Arithmetic Average 
 
 
 Pre-crisis Crisis Short selling ban 
CAC 0.10% -0.22% 0.04% 
DAX 0.14% -0.20% 0.10% 
FTSE 0.09% -0.11% 0.08% 
NASDAQ 0.11% -0.07% 0.12% 
S&P500 0.10% -0.09% 0.11% 
    
    
APRIL 0.01% -0.30% 0.01% 
AXA 0.08% -0.29% 0.11% 
BNP 0.13% -0.58% -0.05% 
CIC 0.16% -0.20% -0.15% 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.06% -0.17% -0.20% 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.20% -0.43% -0.15% 
HEULER 
HERMES 
0.21% -0.23% -0.04% 
NATIXIS 0.08% -0.34% -0.21% 
SCOR 0.20% -0.15% 0.21% 
SOCIETE 
GENERALE 
0.25% -0.47% -0.04% 
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Table 12: Robust Multiple Regression on the Return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 COEFF 
LAG 
COEFF 
INDEX 
COEFF 
TED 
COEFF 
CS 
COEFF 
CRISIS 
COEFF 
SHORT 
T-STAT 
LAG 
T-STAT 
INDEX 
T-STAT 
TED 
T-STAT 
CS 
T-STAT 
CRISIS 
T-STAT 
SHORT 
CAC 0.97 0.01 0.28 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 86.77 16.37 0.15 0.03 -1.50 -0.12 
DAX 0.97 0.01 0.89 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 92.54 16.83 0.48 -0.16 -1.57 -0.32 
FTSE 0.97 0.02 -0.91 0.26 -0.00 0.00 92.00 16.63 -0.64 0.73 -1.17 0.55 
NASDAQ 0.97 0.02 -1.77 0.46 -0.00 0.00 95.58 18.15 -1.05 1.06 -1.03 0.82 
S&P500 0.97 0.02 -1.16 0.31 -0.00 0.00 99.25 17.92 -0.76 0.83 -1.19 0.70 
             
             
APRIL 0.97 0.01 0.55 -2.45 -0.01 0.01 90.62 7.01 -0.92 0.84 -2.21 0.97 
AXA 0.97 0.02 1.70 -0.33 -0.01 -0.00 79.10 13.69 0.44 -0.35 -0.90 -0.27 
BNP 0.95 0.02 5.39 -1.06 -0.01 -0.02 71.82 12.69 1.32 -1.06 -1.33 -1.50 
CIC 0.98 0.01 1.32 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 91.57 5.23 0.65 -0.12 -1.74 -1.25 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.97 0.02 1.35 -0.18 -0.01 -0.01 91.14 12.32 0.33 -0.18 -1.32 -0.63 
EULER 
HERMES 
0.95 0.01 -1.60 0.78 -0.01 -0.01 61.30 7.78 -0.55 1.04 -2.04 -1.04 
NATIXIS 0.96 0.02 4.31 -0.88 -0.01 -0.02 72.12 11.82 1.10 -0.91 -1.06 -1.64 
SCOR 0.95 0.01 -1.30 0.75 -0.01 0.00 68.23 9.79 -0.50 1.15 0.53 -0.50 
SOCGENERALE 0.97 0.02 2.15 -0.21 -0.01 -0.01 82.23 11.84 0.46 -0.18 -1.67 -0.56 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.96 0.01 -0.35 2.71 -0.01 -0.01 70.12 10.33 -0.50 0.93 -1.67 -1.49 
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Table 13: Robust Multiple Regression on the volatility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 COEFF 
LAG 
COEFF 
INDEX 
COEFF 
TED 
COEFF 
CS 
COEFF 
CRISIS 
COEFF 
SHORT 
T-STAT 
LAG 
T-STAT 
INDEX 
T-STAT 
TED 
T-STAT 
CS 
T-STAT 
CRISIS 
T-STAT 
SHORT 
CAC40 0.99 0.00 -3.55 0.52 0.01 0.01 138.50 -0.54 -1.44 0.54 4.87 1.62 
DAX 0.99 0.00 -4.62 0.91 0.02 0.01 157.68 -0.62 -2.35 1.28 6.57 1.50 
FTSE 0.99 -0.00 -2.62 0.74 0.01 0.01 156.28 -0.58 -1.71 1.00 5.42 1.21 
NASDAQ 1.00 -0.00 1.87 -1.72 0.01 -0.01 162.18 1.94 0.93 -1.91 4.34 -2.39 
S&P 1.01 -0.00 2.07 -1.99 0.01 -0.01 163.55 -2.42 1.08 -2.43 4.70 -2.80 
             
             
APRIL 0.96 0.00 -3.68 6.23 0.01 1.07 114.93 -0.38 -1.24 3.45 2.74 1.07 
AXA 0.99 0.00 -11.50 2.32 0.02 0.03 122.05 0.60 -2.42 1.37 4.25 2.09 
BNP 0.99 0.00 -15.22 3.25 0.03 0.05 153.70 0.87 -2.80 2.00 4.04 2.71 
CIC 0.97 0.00 1.31 2.54 0.00 0.01 80.86 -0.10 0.44 1.99 1.86 1.96 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.98 0.00 -7.42 3.85 0.02 0.03 117.00 1.39 -1.37 1.64 3.13 1.85 
EULER 
HERMES 
0.97 0.00 12.88 1.89 0.00 -0.01 148.81 -0.03 3.95 1.67 -0.42 -1.28 
NATIXIS 0.99 0.00 -9.15 2.54 0.03 0.03 84.42 0.08 -1.56 0.94 3.19 1.84 
SCOR 0.98 0.00 -5.36 3.39 0.02 0.02 123.60 -0.17 -2.07 2.95 4.46 2.67 
SOCGENERALE 0.99 0.00 -9.52 3.97 0.03 0.04 114.55 -0.04 -1.54 1.59 3.15 1.93 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.97 0.00 -4.56 5.43 0.01 0.03 132.89 1.34 -1.64 3.83 2.51 3.62 
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Table 14: Robust Multiple Regression on the volatility with exponential volatility 
 COEFF 
LAG 
COEFF 
INDEX 
COEFF 
TED 
COEFF 
CS 
COEFF 
EXPO 
COEFF 
CRISIS 
COEFF 
SHORT 
T-STAT 
LAG 
T-STAT 
INDEX 
T-STAT 
TED 
T-STAT 
CS 
T-STAT 
EXPO 
T-STAT 
CRISIS 
T-STAT 
SHORT 
CAC40 0.90 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.09 0.00 0.00 76.66 -0.50 0.44 0.22 9.62 -0.48 -0.47 
DAX 0.90 0.00 1.14 -0.76 0.09 -0.00 -0.01 91.24 -0.48 0.63 -1.18 10.96 -0.80 -1.71 
FTSE 0.90 0.00 0.34 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.00 87.21 -0.82 0.24 0.18 10.51 0.11 -0.34 
NASDAQ 0.90 0.00 0.53 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.00 81.08 -2.05 0.30 0.24 11.10 -0.06 -0.67 
S&P 0.90 0.00 0.61 0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.01 81.05 -2.49 0.36 0.05 11.16 -0.19 -0.98 
               
               
APRIL 0.89 0.00 -1.06 2.63 0.09 -0.00 -0.00 85.01 -.0.23 -0.40 1.60 10.39 -0.36 -0.42 
AXA 0.89 0.00 5.61 -0.20 0.10 -0.00 -0.01 73.98 0.78 1.26 -0.13 11.19 -0.63 -0.44 
BNP 0.88 0.00 6.12 0.08 0.10 -0.01 0.00 83.99 1.10 1.23 0.05 12.19 -1.06 0.19 
CIC 0.85 0.00 8.19 2.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 53.95 0.02 2.97 1.85 10.32 -1.09 -0.43 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.88 0.00 4.69 -0.04 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 70.94 2.10 0.96 -0.02 11.06 -1.07 -0.29 
EULER 
HERMES 
0.90 0.00 -0.44 0.30 0.09 0.00 0.00 96.86 0.32 -0.14 0.29 9.97 -0.08 -0.39 
NATIXIS 0.88 0.00 4.20 0.00 0.11 0.00 -0.01 57.53 0.34 0.76 0.00 9.51 -0.42 -0.57 
SCOR 0.88 0.00 3.06 0.21 0.11 0.00 0.00 73.64 0.22 1.25 0.19 10.43 0.10 0.14 
SOCGENERALE 0.88 0.00 7.35 -1.08 0.11 -0.00 -0.01 74.01 0.59 1.30 -0.45 10.92 -0.87 -0.72 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.97 0.00 -0.02 0.04 2.40 0.01 0.02 125.29 -2.29 -0.62 3.15 2.40 2.40 2.89 
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Table 15: Robust Multiple Regression on the skewness 
  
 COEFF 
LAG 
COEFF 
INDEX 
COEFF 
TED 
COEFF 
CS 
COEFF 
CRISIS 
COEFF 
SHORT 
T-STAT 
LAG 
T-STAT 
INDEX 
T-STAT 
TED 
T-STAT 
CS 
T-STAT 
CRISIS 
T-STAT 
SHORT 
CAC40 0.94 0.00 12.61 -1.57 -0.02 -0.02 57.75 1.07 1.51 -0.90 -1.98 -1.02 
DAX 0.93 0.01 5.80 -0.52 -0.02 -0.00 50.81 3.28 1.08 -0.41 -1.89 -0.27 
FTSE 0.93 0.00 9.77 -1.47 -0.02 -0.02 50.26 1.32 1.94 -1.31 -2.35 -1.45 
NASDAQ 0.95 0.01 10.41 -3.33 -0.01 0.00 62.05 4.36 1.74 -2.15 -0.98 0.19 
S&P 0.93 0.02 2.81 -0.63 -0.03 0.00 44.00 5.02 0.43 -0.39 -2.42 0.18 
             
             
APRIL 0.95 0.01 0.79 -0.16 -0.01 -0.01 65.46 1.62 0.11 -0.09 -0.92 -0.70 
AXA 0.94 0.01 5.17 0.49 -0.03 0.00 58.98 1.63 0.75 0.32 -2.48 0.08 
BNP 0.94 0.01 -2.39 1.91 -0.02 0.01 58.63 2.49 -0.31 1.10 -1.49 0.74 
CIC 0.97 0.02 -17.73 5.60 0.01 0.01 67.82 3.46 -1.86 2.00 0.70 0.41 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.94 0.00 8.13 0.48 -0.03 -0.00 59.08 2.40 1.12 0.30 -2.68 -0.16 
EULER 
HERMES 
0.95 0.00 2.69 0.20 -0.5 0.02 71.08 -0.04 0.30 0.09 -2.49 0.81 
NATIXIS 0.96 0.00 22.66 -5.80 0.00 -0.01 80.61 1.31 1.61 -1.71 0.14 -0.37 
SCOR 0.97 0.00 -0.15 0.83 -0.01 0.00 77.09 1.54 -0.02 0.51 -1.08 0.19 
SOCGENERALE 0.94 0.01 -2.77 3.07 -0.04 0.00 54.47 3.13 -0.39 1.84 -2.39 0.13 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.97 -0.53 -4.82 1.70 -0.71 2.36 90.38 -2.10 -0.83 1.16 -0.82 1.73 
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Table 16: Robust Multiple Regression on the Kurtosis 
 COEFF 
LAG 
COEFF 
INDEX 
COEFF 
TED 
COEFF 
CS 
COEFF 
CRISIS 
COEFF 
SHORT 
T-STAT 
LAG 
T-STAT 
INDEX 
T-STAT 
TED 
T-STAT 
CS 
T-STAT 
CRISIS 
T-STAT 
SHORT 
CAC40 0.95 -0.01 35.95 -3.69 -0.05 -0.08 92.30 -1.53 1.55 -0.74 -1.41 -1.49 
DAX 0.93 -0.01 9.07 2.17 -0.01 -0.06 59.69 -2.04 0.79 0.75 -0.31 -1.97 
FTSE 0.95 -0.02 4.70 0.88 -0.03 -0.02 90.28 -3.26 0.52 0.41 -1.84 -0.67 
NASDAQ 0.96 -0.03 -9.31 5.35 -0.01 -0.01 80.70 -4.19 -0.61 1.34 -0.33 -0.40 
S&P 0.95 -0.05 -7.09 6.02 -0.01 -0.02 68.65 -4.98 -0.35 1.14 -0.20 -0.37 
             
             
APRIL 0.95 0.10 -0.88 2.60 -0.01 0.03 58.37 1.59 -0.05 0.73 -0.26 1.04 
AXA 0.94 -0.02 68.25 -10.80 -0.02 -0.11 90.50 -2.07 3.24 -2.41 -1.07 -2.45 
BNP 0.96 .0.2 6.44 -0.91 0.01 0.00 112.62 -2.20 0.32 -0.20 0.52 0.06 
CIC 0.93 0.00 -16.32 14.35 0.01 0.20 50.51 0.03 -0.62 2.02 0.26 2.73 
CREDIT 
AGRICOLE 
0.94 0.00 32.42 -4.35 -0.04 0.01 55.29 0.41 1.40 -0.83 -1.24 0.24 
EULER HERMES 0.98 0.01 13.25 -2.11 0.07 .0.05 107.00 0.53 0.40 -0.26 1.08 -0.62 
NATIXIS 0.96 -0.02 3.94 9.76 -0.06 -0.11 81.90 -0.94 0.08 0.80 -0.81 -0.94 
SCOR 0.97 -0.01 -3.99 4.91 -0.01 -0.01 84.72 -0.99 -0.30 1.24 -0.68 -0.43 
SOCGENERALE 0.94 -0.01 35.00 -4.27 -0.02 -0.03 70.27 -0.81 1.59 -0.87 -0.75 -0.70 
CNP 
ASSURANCES 
0.95 -0.99 -28.36 7.05 1.58 7.91 67.93 -1.36 -1.70 1.68 0.63 1.99 
